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1 Monte Carlo Evidence
We present results from a simulation study in this section to (1) demonstrate that our
estimation procedure performs well in a controlled, small-sample environment, (2) illustrate
that failing to account for the unobservability of the potential number of firms can lead to
biased estimates of model parameters, and (3) address some additional issues that may arise
in empirical applications where limited data are available.
Based on the designed “true” parameter values
(
θTrue
)
, we construct a simulated dataset
based on the underlying theoretical model as follows. For each simulated period, t, we
randomly draw a number of firms for that period, Nt ∈ {2, 3, ..., 15} from a discrete uniform
distribution. (The upper bound of this distribution corresponds to the maximum number of
listings we observed across all product-dates in the actual data.) Next, we make Nt Bernoulli
draws with parameter α∗(Nt; θTrue) (defined in Proposition 1 of the main paper) to simulate
whether each of these Nt firms list or not. Let At ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 15} denote the number of
firms listing prices in simulated period t. For each of these At firms, we next draw a listed
price from the distribution F ∗(p|Nt; θTrue) defined in Proposition 1 of the main paper. We
repeat this process until we have retained exactly T simulated periods—the sample-size. Our
simulations consider sample sizes of T = 600 and T = 1200.
In addition to examining the performance of our estimation procedure in small sample
environments, we also use the simulation to address some additional issues. One such issue
is whether controlling for unobservability in the number of firms “matters.” As discussed in
Section 2 of the main paper, several existing studies of online price dispersion simply assume
that N = A in estimation. To evaluate the degree to which controlling for unobservability
of N matters, we compare the estimates obtained from our two-step approach with those
where N = A is assumed (henceforth, the “na¨ıve” specification). In particular, we use MLE
methods, i.e. equation (9) in the main paper to estimate the model parameters θ under the
na¨ıve specification.
Another issue addressed by the simulation is the impact of pooling observations with
large numbers of participating firms into a single cell of the matrix used in estimation.
More specifically, the first step of estimation requires the manipulation of a 14× 14 matrix;
however, in small sample environments there will be only a few observations where the
number of listings is above some threshold, and this may lead to inaccuracy in the matrix
decomposition. To examine this, we pool simulated observations for large A, e.g., we combine
all the observations with A ≥ 11 into a single bin to determine its effects on the resulting
parameter estimates. While the results of Baye and Morgan (2009) provide a theoretical
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Table 1: Monte Carlo Results
T=600 T=1200
Params.
True
value
Two-step
estimate
(1)
Two-step
estimate
(2)
“Na¨ıve”
estimate
Two-step
estimate
(1)
Two-step
estimate
(2)
“Na¨ıve”
estimate
φ 5 5.25 5.42 3.24 5.35 5.29 3.35
(0.74) (0.66) (1.41) (0.63) (0.59) (0.97)
r 300 290.99 287.63 266.97 300.03 308.17 269.74
(29.60) (23.16) (130.25) (26.81) (19.62) (121.39)
m 120 107.04 114.45 135.48 106.31 122.79 136.96
(5.74) (12.54) (35.21) (6.40) (13.01) (37.01)
M 15 15.54 17.39 46.07 15.33 14.80 45.46
(1.62) (2.81) (11.60) (1.46) (1.68) (9.59)
S 10 13.02 8.31 22.01 12.80 12.03 20.88
(1.07) (0.99) (7.75) (1.41) (0.72) (8.79)
γ 0.1 0.09 0.12 0.20 0.09 0.10 0.19
(0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
justification for pooling observations where the number of firms is above some threshold, the
impact of pooling for a given threshold is an empirical issue.
More specifically, this approach imposes restrictions on the joint distribution between A
and N when both A and N exceed 11, and these may impact the resulting estimates. Thus,
we compare the estimated parameters when pooling the data A ≥ 11 and A ≥ 8, respectively,
as a single matrix cell with the true parameter values used to produce the simulated data.
The simulation results are presented in Table 1, along with standard errors obtained
via bootstrapping (with 200 resamples employed). Results in column (1) correspond to
estimates where we pool observations consisting of A ≥ 11 listings into a single bin. Results
in column (2) offer estimates when we pool observations where A ≥ 8 list prices. Finally,
the columns labeled “Na¨ıve estimate” correspond to estimates assuming N = A. As Table
1 reveals, regardless of the pooling procedure or whether the sample size is 600 or 1200,
the parameters are precisely estimated using our two-step procedure, and very close to
the true values. By contrast, when we (wrongly) assume the number actual and potential
competitors are the same, the resulting “Na¨ıve” estimates do not closely correspond to the
true parameters. Specifically, this approach results in estimates that understate the true
listing fee (φ) and overstate the number of shoppers (S), the conversion rate (γ) as well
as the total number of loyals (M). Intuitively, treating the observed number of listings as
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the actual number of competing firms understates the degree of competition in the market,
since, A ≤ N. Nevertheless, it is an empirical question how the “na¨ıve” approach affects the
estimation of parameters and there is no theoretical guidance. On balance, these simulations
suggest that failing to account for the unobservability of the potential number of firms can
produce distorted estimates of model parameters.
2 Proof of Proposition 1
As in Baye and Morgan (2001), it is readily seen that equilibrium has the following two key
properties: (1) A firm must be indifferent between listing its price at the clearinghouse or
not; and (2) a firm must earn the same expected payoff from posting any price p ∈ [p0, r] at
the clearinghouse.
A firm that eschews the comparison site earns profits of
pi0 = (r −m) γM
N
+ (r −m) (1− α)N−1 γS
N
(1)
A firm that advertises a price r on the site earns
pi = (r −m) γM
N
+ (r −m) (1− α)N−1 γS − c (1− α)N−1 S − φ
Since firms must be indifferent between listing or not, it then follows that pi = pi0. We may
use this equality to obtain a closed-form expression for α:
(r −m) γM
N
+(r −m) (1− α)N−1 γS
N
= (r −m) γM
N
+(r −m) (1− α)N−1 γS−c (1− α)N−1 S−φ
Simplifying, this reduces to
φ = (1− α)N−1 S
(
(r −m) γN − 1
N
− c
)
(2)
Or equivalently,
(1− α)N−1 = φ
S
(
(r −m) γN−1
N
− c)
=
Nφ
S ((r −m) γ (N − 1)−Nc)
Hence, the equilibrium advertising propensity is:
α∗ = 1−
(
φ
S
(
(r −m) γN−1
N
− c)
) 1
N−1
(3)
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The conditions on φ and c identified in Proposition 1 in the main paper imply that α∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Substituting for α∗ in equation (1) , we obtain equilibrium profits of :
pi0 = (r −m) γM
N
+ (r −m) φ
S
(
(r −m) γN−1
N
− c) γSN
= (r −m) γM
N
+
φ
N
(
1− c
(r−m)γ
)
− 1
It remains to determine the equilibrium distribution of listed prices. Recall that a firm
listing a price p, earns expected profits of
pi (p) = (p−m) γM
N
+ (p−m) (1− αF (p))N−1 γS − c (1− αF (p))N−1 S − φ
Such a firm must be indifferent between charging p and not advertising at all, i.e. pi (p) = pi0.
It is convenient to express pi0 in terms of α for the moment. Hence, we have:
pi (p) = (p−m) γM
N
+ (p−m) (1− αF (p))N−1 γS − c (1− αF (p))N−1 S − φ
= (r −m) γM
N
+ (r −m) (1− α)N−1 γS
N
= pi0
Solving this expression for (1− αF (p))N−1, we obtain
(1− αF (p))N−1 = (r − p) γ
M
N
+ (r −m) (1− α)N−1 γS
N
+ φ
S ((p−m) γ − c)
=
(r − p) γM
N
+ (r−m)γN−Nc
(r−m)γ(N−1)−Ncφ
S ((p−m) γ − c)
which implies
F (p) =
1
α
1−((r − p) γMN + (r−m)γN−Nc(r−m)γ(N−1)−Ncφ
S ((p−m) γ − c)
) 1
N−1

To verify that F (p) is a well-defined atomless probability distribution, we will first show
that F (r) = 1, or equivalently, (1− αF (r))N−1 = (1− α)N−1. To see this, note that
(1− αF (r))N−1 =
(r−m)γN−Nc
(r−m)γ(N−1)−Ncφ
S ((r −m) γ − c)
=
Nφ
S ((r −m) γ (N − 1)−Nc)
= (1− α)N−1
where α is defined in equation (3) .
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Next, we determine the lower support of the equilibrium listed price distribution; that is
p0, where F (p0) = 0. Equivalently, p0 satisfies (1− αF (p0))N−1 = 1, or
(r − p0) γMN + (r−m)γN−Nc(r−m)γ(N−1)−Ncφ
S ((p0 −m) γ − c) = 1
Cross-multiplying and collecting the p0 terms:
γrM
N
+
(r −m)γN −Nc
(r −m) γ (N − 1)−Ncφ+ Sγm+ Sc = p0
(
Sγ +
M
N
γ
)
Solving for p0 gives
p0 = m+
1(
Sγ + M
N
γ
) (γM
N
(r −m) + (r −m)γN −Nc
(r −m) γ (N − 1)−Ncφ+ Sc
)
which exceeds m.
Finally, we verify that F is strictly increasing, or equivalently, that (1− αF (p))N−1 is
strictly decreasing in p. Recall that
(1− αF (p))N−1 =
(r − p) γM
N
+ (r−m)γN−Nc
(r−m)γ(N−1)−Ncφ
S ((p−m) γ − c)
and define num ≡ (r − p) γM
N
+ (r−m)γN−Nc
(r−m)γ(N−1)−Ncφ > 0 and den ≡ S ((p−m) γ − c) > 0.
Differentiating with respect to p reveals
∂ (1− αF (p))N−1
∂p
= −γ
M
N
(den) + Sγ (num)
(den)2
< 0.
One can enrich the model to allow some shoppers not to click on any offer, perhaps
owing to finding the listed prices or products unacceptable. Likewise allowing conversions
to decrease with the price can also be accommodated. This would result in firm demand per
shopper being some function Ip=pminδ (p) γ (p) , where I is an indicator function and δ (p)
represents the probability of not clicking as a (decreasing) function of p, and similarly for
loyals. This formulation is isomorphic to a setting where consumers have downward sloping
demand, as in Baye and Morgan (2001). The qualitative characteristics of the resulting
distribution of prices and the probability of advertising on the comparison site are identical
to the simpler model we study. Thus, we opt for the simpler specification for purposes of
estimation.
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